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NOTES.
OF DRAWEE BANK.-In Weis
berger Co. v. Barberton Savings Bank Co.," the plaintiff was indebted to Max Roth, whose address was 48 Walker St., New York
City. The plaintiff drew a check on the defendant bank to the order
of Max Roth and inadvertently addressed the envelope to 48 Walker
St., Cleveland, Ohio. -A Max Roth, who lived on Henry Street in
Cleveland, obtained possession of the check, had it cashed by a
saloonkeeper and it passed through two collecting -banks before
being finally paid by the defendant bank. The amount of the check
was debited to the plaintiff's account and this action was brought
for the recovery of the money. A judgment for the defendant was
affirmed, the court saying: "We decide this case on its own peculiar
facts and make no search for, or examination of, reported cases."
Under the law merchant, the forgery of the name of the payee
precludes recovery by any indorsee, 2 and the money paid to an
indorsee when the drawee bank is ignorant of the forgery of the
payee's name can be recovered." Payment to an indorsee when the
CHECKS-FORGERY-LIABILITY

95 N. E. 631 (Ohio, 1911).
5

Mead v. Young, 4 T. R.
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name of the payee has been forged is a breach of the contract between
the depositor and the drawee bank, entitling the depositor to maintain an action against the bank.4
The signing of his name by a man who knows that another person of the same name was intended will sustain an indictment for
forgery. 5
Where commercial paper is involved, the test as to whether or
not the signing is a forgery seems to be whether or not the man indorsing the paper is the one who was intended to indorse it, even
though he may have been expected to act under an assumed name.,
Obviously in the principal case, the Max Roth in Cleveland
was not the one intended. His act was a forgery and under the principles above stated, clearly the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The
precise question has seldom been raised, but in cases where such a
forgery as that in this case has been done, a bona fide indorsee has
been denied recovery against the drawee bank,7 and where the money
has already been paid to a bona fide indorsee, the drawee bank has
been allowed to recover it.8 The real payee, securing possession of
the check after it has been paid and cancelled is still in a position to
sue on it."
It is well argued that a bank is guilty of no negligence in paying
to a person of the name designated on the instrument; that it cannot be expected that financial institutions shall inquire into the relations of their depositors so intimately as to ascertain whether or
not the particular payee named is the one with whom their depositor
would be likely to carry on business. 10 This view is not altogether
unsupported by authority," and in other branches of the law such a
rule has been recognized, 12 but to adopt it is merely to abrogate
another of the settled principles of the law merchant.
In England, by statute, recovery would be denied the plaintiff;"3
but section 9 of the Bills of Exchange Act has not been re-enacted
in the N. I. L. and the common law in this particular is therefore
unchanged. Taken at its best, there is some question as to whether
or not the decision in the principal case is in complete harmony with
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
C. A. S.
"McNeely Company v. Bank of North America, 2I Pa. 588 (Io8).
"People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 71 (1826) ; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga.
127 (1859); U. S. v. Long, 3o Fed. 678 (x887).
'Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231 (x886) ; Emporia Bank v. Shotwell,
35 Kan. 360 (i8861.
Beattie v. National Bank of Illinois, 174 Ill. 571 (I898).
'Cochran v. Atchison, 27 Kan. 728 (1882).
'Indiana National Bank v. Holtsclaw, 98 Ind. 85 (1884).
102 Morse on Banks and Banking, Sec. 474.
'Dissent of L. Kenyon in Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28 (i79o).
"Wilson v. Express Co., 27 Mo. App. 36o (1887); Samuel v. Cheney,
135 Mass. 278 (1883).
2316-17 Vict., c. 59, sec. XIX; B. E. A., 45-46 Vict., c. 6r, sec. LX.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
has recently decided' that the period of twenty-one years referred
to in the Act of 1855, " as limiting the right to recover on a ground

rent, is the period of twenty-one years next preceding the suit. In
the case before the court a conveyance of certain land in Philadelphia, out of which a ground rent was reserved, had been made in
1849. The ground rent was not recorded until I9oo, nor was any
payment made upon it prior to that time. In 19oo the ground rent
was sold to the plaintiff, and payments were made for five years.
The land was then conveyed to a person who had knowledge of the
incumbrance. The defendant held title through him and set up the
Statute of I855 as a defense to an action on the rent.
The question was, therefore, raised whether the period of
twenty-one years of non-payment and non-claim is the twenty-one
years next before the suit is brought, or whether any period of
twenty-one consecutive years satisfies the statute. Upon this point
there is no previous direct decision. Judge Morrison, after a detailed review of the cases applying the Act of 1855,2" concluded that
the twenty-one years must immediately precede the suit. In considering this conclusion, it is important to keep in mind that while
these cases may tend to establish the construction noted, yet no
case, even by way of dictum, had laid down the proposition in words.
It is well to note also that in all the cases referred to, the period
of non-payment did immediately precede the suit-a situation
obviously covered by the statute,-so that it is not at all certain that
the remarks of these courts, addressed to the facts before them,
can be interpreted as restrictive of the statute to similar conditions.
Without attempting to criticize in any way the interpretation given
these cases, they do not seem conclusive of the question. Nor are
the words of the statute standing alone of any assistance. The act
merely states that "where * * * no payment * * * shall have been

made upon any ground rent for twenty-one years * * * such ground
rent shall not thereafter be recoverable." There is no reference in
any way to this period as relating to a suit by the owner of the
ground rent.
Without more, therefore, it would certainly be permissible to
conclude that the legislature meant merely a period of twenty-one
consecutive years, no matter when the suit should be brought. And

the plain purpose of these statutes,-to unfetter real estate and
make it freely alienable,*--would seem to weigh the balance in favor
v. Green, 48 Pa. Sup. 1 (IgIi).
'Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 369.
'The most important cases referred to are Korn v. Browne, 64 Pa. 55;
Biddle v. Hoover, 12o Pa. 221; Wallace v. Pittsburgh Church, 152 Pa. 258;
Heiss v. Banister, 176 Pa. 337; Clay v. Iseminger, i9o Pa. 58o (185 U. S. 55).
In all these cases the period of non-payment extended directly back from the
bringing of suit. The situation in our principal case apparently never
occurred to the minds of these justices.
' See Dissent of Head, J., in Murphy v. Green, supra.
'Murphy
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of a liberal construction.5 In the face of these reasons for such
legislation the conclusion of the court in the case under discussion
presents this anomalous situation. The plaintiff, had he brought
suit in 1899, would have been barred by the statutory limitation of
his right of action; but by delaying for thirteen years longer, he
finds all disabilities removed. Moreover, as Judge Head points out
in his dissenting opinion, this conclusion practically allows the creation of an irredeemable ground rent, a thing utterly forbidden by
the Act of 1885.8

In the course of their opinion the court states that ground rents
are not real estate, arguing that this is shown by the enactment of
separate statutes relating to ground rents, whereas had they been
real estate the statutes of limitation' would have applied to them.
Many Pennsylvania decisions have taken the view that ground rents
are realty.8 Yet the owners of ground rents and the owners of
land do not hold estates of the same nature. On the contrary, they
are separate and distinct estates,0 one being a corporeal inheritance
10
This was,
in fee and the other an incorporeal inheritance in fee.
perhaps, sufficient to cause the legislature to distinguish between the
two, though both may be regarded as real estate, legally speaking.
However, the decision is conclusive on the requirement that the
period of limitation immediately precede the bringing of suit, a matter which it is well to have definitely settled in the law.
C. H. S., Jr.
INSURANCE-WHAT IS AN AccIDENT?---4Plaintiff, while washing clothes in a tub, was splashed in the eye. Thereupon her eye
became inflamed and subsequently she lost the sight of it. Upon
additional evidence submitted, the jury found that her sight was
destroyed by the splashing of the water, it being laden with gonorrheal germs. The court allowed a recovery on an accident insurance
policy. Upon appeal, it being assigned for error, inter alia, that
the plaintiff's infection could not be properly classed as the effect
of accident, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.,
. Although the courts have ii many cases been called upon to
decide whether injury from particulh.r causes was or was not accidental, no generally satisfactory definition of an accident has yet
been laid down. The United States Supreme Court has defined it

'See the preamble to the Act of 1885, abolishing irredeemable ground
rents: "Whereas, The policy of this Commonwealth has always been to
encourage the free fransmission of real estate and to remove restrictions

on alienations," etc.
'Act of June 24, i885, P. L. i61.

' Act

of March 26, 1785, 2 Sm. Laws, 299, sec. 2.

'Cadwalader on Ground Rents in Pa., see. I9o, and cases cited.
'McQuigg v. Morton, 39 Pa. 3r.
" Cadwalader on Ground Rents, sec. 230.
Sullivan v. Brotherhood, 133 N. W. 486 (Mich., r9II).

NOTES

as anything "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not
according to the usual course of things. If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual
or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental
means. But if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury,
then the injury has resulted through accidental means." 2 "The
word is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not
their natural or probable consequences. * * * An effect which is
not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be
reasonably anticipated from the use of those means, an effect which
the actor did not intend to produce, and which he cannot be charged
(under the maxim that one is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his act) with the design of producing, is
produced by accidental means." 3
The typical case, on which practically all jurisdictions are
agreed, is where the act causing the injury is unintentional or involuntary on the part of the insured, or out of the usual course of
things. Examples of this class of case are: Blood-poisoning, resulting from the lodging of a fish bone in the intestines ;4 a knife cut,
self-inflicted while trimming a corn ;' stumbling while .running and
falling against an engine; blood-poisoning from an abrasion by a
new shoe, of the skin of a toe ;7 death caused by a piece of steak
passing into and lodging in the windpipe.8
The difficulty and confusion exists where the acts of the insured
are purely voluntary and intentional, but the result is out of the
usual course of things. Where a bicycle rider was injured by the
action of a muscle rubbing against his appendix, no recovery was
allowed, the court declaring that the insured planned for and deliberately entered upon the project; that it was carried out precisely
as he intended; and that there was no evidence that he did anything
other than what he fully intended to do; the result of such ride,
while extraordinary, in no manner proves that it was accidental. 9
A like conclusion was reached in a case where the insured, in reaching over a chair to close a shutter, suffered a hemorrhage, 0 the court
adding that the unfortunate circumstance was the natural and direct
effect of acts intenionally done. On the same ground no recovery
was allowed for rupturing a blood vessel in suddenly jumping and
2 Accident

Ass'n. v. Barry, 131 U. S. IOO (1888).

'Western Ass'n. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 4O (1898).
'Appel v. Ins. Co., 86 N. Y. App. 83 (19o3).
'Nax v. Ins. Co., 23o Fed. 985 (1904).
'Ins. Co. v. Osborne, go Ala. 2oi (i88g).
' Western Assn. v. Smith, supra.
"Accident Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547 (893).
'Appel v. Ins. Co., supra.
"Feder v. Ass'n., 107 Ia. 538 (1899).
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running from a stationary train;" a hemorrhage resulting in an
attempt to extricate one's arms entangled in a nightgown over his
head. 12 But opposite conclusions were reached in analogous cases,
as a result of common-sense reasoning on the part of the juries,
with proper instructions from the courts. In swinging Indian clubs,
the insured ruptured a blood vessel, and recovery on the policy was
allowed,"3 the court charging: "that if the deceased used the clubs
for exercise in the ordinary way, and without the interference of
any unusual circumstances, the injury was not accidental; but if
there occurred any unforeseen accident or involuntary movement of
the body (such as a slight twitch or turn) which in connection with
the use of the clubs brought about the injury, then such means were
accidental, and within the terms of the policy." On the same principle, recovery was had for blood-poisoning caused by the insured
intentionally giving himself a hypodermic injecton;14 and for the
rupturing of the tympanum, following a dive into a swimming pool.1"
The fair inference from the Pennsylvania cases is that the
result determines whether the injury was accidental. "An accident
is an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation;
an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual
effect of a known cause, and, therefore, not expected."' 6
M. G.
NEGLIGENCE-THE "RULE OF THE RoAD."-A recent case 1
raised the question of the rights and liabilities of drivers of vehicles
on public streets. A wagon was proceeding along the left-hand
side of a street, twenty feet wide. On the same side of the street
there was a high board fence. The plaintiff, a boy of eleven years,
was coming up behind the wagon on a bicycle, and started to pass
between it and the fence on the left. As he was even with the
front of the wagon, the horses swerved towards him; and before
the driver could get them back, they had thrown the boy against the
fence. The driver had not known that the boy was back of him,
or that he was attempting to pass. The court affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff, upholding the trial judge, who had allowed the
jury to say whether or not the conduct of the driver was negligent.
There were twopoints decided in the case. In the first place,
the court had to consider whether negligence can be imputed from
a violation of the so-called "Rule of the Road." The question was
answered in the negative. This, it will be seen, is representative of
"Southard v. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 574 (1868).
"Smouse v. Ass'n., 118 Ia. 436 (igo2).
"Lovelace v. Ass'n., i26 Mo. 1O4 (1894).
"Bailey v. Casualty Co., 8 N. Y. App. 127 (I896).
"Rodey v. Ins. Co., 3 N. M. 316 (i886).
"Ins. Co. v. Burrough, 69 Pa. 43 (187); Pollock v. Ass'n., iO2 Pa. 23o
(883).
'Hackitt v. Alamito Sanitary Dairy Co., 133 N. W. 227 (Neb., 1911).

NO TES

the weight of authority. The authorities in England are confined
to about a half-dozen short cases in the early part of the last century.2 The law as contained in them seems to be that a breach of
the rule of the road is not per se negligence. Thus, it was held, in
Pluckwell v. Wilson, 3 that a person is not bound to keep to the
customary side of the road, but that if he does not, he is bound to
use more care and diligence, and to keep a better lookout than would
be requisite, were he on the proper side. Again, in Wayde v. Lady
Carr,4 the court said: "In the crowded streets of a metropolis * * *
situations and circumstances might frequently arise where a deviation from what is called the law of the road would be not only
justifiable, but absolutely necessary." Of course, under some circumstances a violation of the rule of the road may mean the pursuance of a negligent course of conduct;5 but the mere fact of the
violation is no negligence. In America, where the custom is to keep
on the right, and to pass a team in front on the left, the majority of
courts likewise hold that a breach of the rule of the road does not,
in itself, spell negligence. So it has been decided that driving on
the left-hand side of the road is not actionable negligence, nor con7
tributory negligence.
The same is true of passing a team in front
8

on the right.

This, of course, does not mean that an observance of the customs of travelling is unnecessary. That is one of the' many circumstances which the jury are to take into account in determining the
question of negligence. The simple question is whether the driver
is exercising the care required of him; and his position, relative
to the middle of the road may be all-importantY
The second point decided by the court was, that though a driver
is not bound to keep to the proper side, if he does not do so he must
use more care and keep a better lookout to avoid collision than would
be necessary on the proper side. This is a harking back to the decision
of Pluckwell v. Wilson.' 0 It is significant, however, to note that
in the latter case it does not appear whether the two vehicles were
going in the same or in opposite directions. This, of course, is an
essential fact, as the duty of a driver to one coming towards him
Mews' Eng. Case Law Dig., 46.
8S C. & P. 375 (1832).
42 Dow. & Ry. 255 (1822).
'An excellent example of this is the case of Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593
(x83). Here the sole evidence of the defendant's negligence was his driving
on the wrong side of the road on a very dark night. Under these circumstances one who, while travelling in the opposite direction to the defendant,
was run into by him, was allowed to recover.
'Rand v. Syms, 162 Mass. 163 (1894).
"Wood v. Boston Elevated Ry., 188 Mass. i61 (1905).
8
Elenz v. Conrad, 123 Ia. 522 (1904) ; Foster v. Goddard, 40 Me. 54
(i855) ; Bolton v. Colder, I Watts 360 (Pa., 1832). Only these two instances
of the rule of the road are dealt with here, as they are the only ones
involved in the decision of the case.
'Meservey
v. Lockett, 16i Mass. 332 (1894).
10
2io

Supra.
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may not be the same as that owed to one coming behind him. It is
but reasonable to demand of one driving on the left side of a street
that he keep a very sharp lookout for vehicles coming towards him
on the same side, and upon meeting them to turn out. But can it
be expected that he keep an equally sharp lookout for vehicles coming up behind him? The additional care, suggested as incumbent
on the driver on the left side, as to vehicles behind him, can consist
of nothing but a constant turning around to see if another driver
is about to, or desirous of, passing. Yet this might readily amount
to negligence to drivers in front of him or at his side. Again, passing a team is, to a certain extent, a hazardous undertaking-certainly, at least, when the street is as narrow as it was in the principal
case. It seems just, therefore, that he who undertakes such a
manceuvre should act with the greatest care; and it is not evident
that such passage has been rendered more dangerous by the front
driver's being on the left rather than on the right side of the street
In a practical question like this, the advisability of a rule of law
should be measured by its efficiency; and it is difficult to see how
travelling is made more safe by throwing the burden of additional
prudence on the driver in front rather than on the one in the rear.
The court cites only one case in support of this rule, and that
is a lower court decision."
The prevailing view throws the peril on
12
the party passing, regardless of the position of the driver in front.
Of course, when the driver in front is aware of the desire and intention of the driver in the rear to pass, he owes him a duty to
exercise reasonable care not to injure him.' 3 It seems, therefore,
that the only ground upon which the court could rule that there
was such evidence of negligence in the principal case as to warrant
its being sent to the jury, was that the duty of the driver toward
the plaintiff was so great, because of his presence on the left side,
that his allowing the horses to swerve towards the fence, was a
breach of it. This is open to serious criticism.
P.V.R.M.
Lonergan v. Martin, 4 Misc. Rep. 624 (N. Y., 1893).
St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Schaub, 29 Ill. App. 549 (1888); Avenno v.
Hart, 25 La. Ann. 235 (1873); Altenlairch v. National Biscuit Co., 127 App.
Div. 3o7 (N. Y., i9o8). In Bierbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 15 Fed.
49o (1883), it was said that the law does not impose upon the driver
of a vehicle in a crowded city thoroughfare the duty of giving a signal to
the vehicles behind him of his intention to turn; but it is the duty of
the driver in the rear of such vehicle to be on the lookout for such a
deviation from the course by the driver in the advance. Although both
parties are bound to use ordinary prudence and care, yet ordinary care on
the part of the driver of a team following another team in the streets
of a city may mean, in the circumstances in which the parties are placed,
a higher degree of care than would be expected from the driver of the
team in advance. The case of Young v. Cowden, 98 Tenn. 577 (1896)
goes to the extent of saying that it is the duty of the driver of the hindmost
of two vehicles proceeding in the same direction, who desires to pass the
other, which is occupying the portion of the roadway to which he is entitled,
to stop and give warning to the driver of that vehicle, so as to avoid a
collision, and, not to attempt to pass unless he can do so safely.
"Breman v. Richardson, 38 App. Div. 463 (N. Y., 1899),

